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Abstract
This article explores the nature of play and its presence and potential in
teaching and learning encounters. Play is portrayed as a movement that
can characterize the process of learning and teachers’ reflections on their
practice. The exercise of techne and phronesis are found to be key but
problematic elements in this movement. The paper is in the form of a
conversation, a medium calling the authors themselves to play with the
play that might occur in classrooms. Thus, the authors’ play is itself a
subject for inquiry. Their interplay warrants considering play to be an
elemental activity for reconceptualizing teaching/learning practices.
As new academic colleagues in a teachers college we discover a mutual educational
concern regarding the lack of genuine conversation in teaching/learning situations.
Attracted further by the call of possibility and desire for community, we enter into
playful conversation. On the one hand, we have some personal aims—to understand
each other better and to learn from each other. On the other hand, though, we have a
broader professional interest. Through our conversation below, we hope to show
conversation and play as legitimate, indeed essential, activities of inquiry and
pedagogical relationship in teaching and learning. Much of current educational reform is
potentially hostile to these activities (for example, high-stakes achievement testing and
standards such as the Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium’s
[INTASC] with their emphasis on “strategies” and “techniques” [Hostetler, 2002]).
There is critical need to retrieve these activities, which are at the center of good teaching
and learning.
Some Preliminary Thoughts on Conversation and Play
So what do we mean by “conversation” and “play?” These are ideas that elude easy
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definition, hence as we argue below, the need to play with them. Nevertheless, we do
offer some preliminary orientation to these ideas before we launch into our
conversation. Like German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer we understand language,
the medium of conversation, to be the medium of all understanding. Gadamer (1989)
takes up conversation as a mode of play. He insists that to understand conversation as
play it is critical not to imply any frivolousness or lack of seriousness on the part of the
conversational participants, but rather, to suggest that only through suspension of
participants’ subjectivities can the matter at issue come to be revealed and understood.
Gadamer describes this as “the primacy of play over the consciousness of the players”
(p. 104). To give a trivial example, to really understand baseball, one really has to be a
player. And while players surely bring individual talent and style to the game, at least if
they want to play well, they cannot play the game any old way they want; their
“subjectivities” have to be suspended. Good base stealers do not try to steal a base
whenever they want. They take their cues from the game—the score, the inning, the
number of outs in the inning—and the common concern of winning the game.
Similarly, Gadamer (1989) asserts that the movement of a genuine conversation
transcends distinct viewpoints (pp. 378-379). Part of this movement involves a focus
upon some subject matter. This conversational play has an aim—understanding the
subject matter at hand. And because the aim is understanding, participants must
“transcend” their current opinions: “To reach an understanding in dialogue is not merely
a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view,
but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were” (p.
379). This “communion” does not imply agreement; people still will speak from their
own experiences and other “prejudices.” Still, the aim is to speak as the conversation
demands rather than merely as one’s own current beliefs demand.
We hope to gain insights into this sort of conversational play. For example, to what
extent can one really “transcend” one’s viewpoint? Do we really accomplish anything
through our conversation? When we begin we are not sure what will happen. One of us
has been a serious student of play; the other has only toyed with the idea. One of us has
spent a great deal of time observing and analyzing teachers at play in their classrooms;
the other spends very little time in classrooms. One of us takes an interpretive approach;
the other was schooled in the analytic tradition in philosophy. What sort of play can we
have? What sort of conversation?
The Subject Matter of Our Conversation
The object of our conversational play is the aesthetic play that might occur in
classrooms. By aesthetic play we are referring to an attunement to the creating process
in sense making; a sensitivity (on the parts of teachers and students) to the many
nuances and possibilities present in learning situations and a willingness to take up the
call to play (see also Barone, 1983; Dewey, 1934; Eisner, 1992; Gadamer, 1989;
Grumet, 1993; May, 1993). We use data from a two-year inquiry (Note 1) into the
nature of play in a middle school attempting to value the creating process, primary to the
arts, across the entire school curricula. This provides opportunities to converse about
2
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how teachers might play with ideas, yield to play in their classrooms, or perhaps resist
the call to play.
One of us was the researcher in this school attending to the consequences of aesthetic
play in classrooms for learners, learning, teachers, and teaching. Three teachers
participated in this inquiry by providing artifacts of their planning processes, interviews
pursuing theory/practice relations, and extending full access to their classrooms for
researcher participant/observation documentation. Two of the participants (Diane and
Laurie) were sixth grade teachers responsible for all core subject matter. The other
participant (Lorraine) was a seventh/eighth grade humanities teacher responsible for
integrating language arts, social studies, and health. Each participant understood that her
role and place as a teacher was to foster greater attention to the creating process across
all sense making on the parts of students. Excerpts from these teachers’ accounts serve
as an opening into conversation. The reader is invited to take up these questions too, to
embrace the hermeneutic task “coming into conversation with the text” (Gadamer, 1989,
pp. 331, 350).
Teacher Accounts
Diane, a teacher, comments:
Every once in a while I step back from the flow in my classroom and panic. I ask
myself, can students name specific concepts? I dislike these moments. They interrupt the
momentum created. I think I am always cognizant of substantial learning. But, when I
find myself and my students most lost and caught up in inquiry processes, I feel myself
called back to label the learning. (Int. #1, 4/3/98)
Laurie, another teacher, notes:
Some students just don’t get it. The answer or solution is not going to fall from heaven. I
get exhausted saying, “There is not one right way, but many ways.” I have to derive
pleasure from every little step experienced in this regard. Some days the movement
towards this seems painstakingly slow. I do know that the only way to convince students
otherwise is through involvement in their schoolwork. (Int. #1, 4/3/98)
A third teacher, Lorraine, comments:
I find it incredibly difficult to discuss this sort of work with others. People who espouse
creativity for creativity’s sake don’t like the structure involved in setting things up so
that students can self-organize and allow things to enfold and move to more complex
levels; people who are more linear are frustrated by the lack of closure and my inability
to share a nice set of step by step lesson plans. I’ve often wondered what these sorts of
lessons would look like to some outsider who is just visiting for the day. How would
they make sense of the wonderful connections to past encounters as well as to future
ones? Would such lessons seem unfocussed, chaotic? And that is one of my current
frustrations: how to look at curriculum with a bigger picture in mind and not just a bit at
3
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a time. (Int. #8, 6/6/00)
These thoughts are the subject matter that drew us together. Thus, the conversation has
begun. How shall we understand play? How should it be part of a teacher’s work?
Conversational Play/Playful Conversation
Margaret. Diane’s words suggest aesthetic play is a movement that takes hold of the
learning encounter. She experiences an attunement within the inquiry process that
absorbs her attention. Laurie knows this movement of aesthetic play, too. She claims
personal involvement is the necessary catalyst for her students towards a felt
understanding of aesthetic play’s relation to learning. Lorraine is keenly aware of the
connectiveness of this learning movement from parts to whole, back to parts again. It is
impossible for Lorraine to distinguish any one discrete part. The learning in Lorraine’s
classroom is recursive and related, with encounters having a history and a future. I
observe students in all three classrooms actively structuring what is encountered in
learning situations. These students are positioned to be receptive to sensory qualities and
relations between self and subject matter, constructing and re-constructing, questioning
and re-considering, on an on-going basis. Seemingly, aesthetic play is intimately and
necessarily tied to the making, adapting, changing processes of created learning
encounters. Dewey (1938) terms such a learning encounter an “experience” that is a
“moving force” (p. 38). He further stresses that failure on the parts of teachers to take
this moving force into account betrays the movement altogether. Attending to the
movement requires sensitivity, searching for attunement within the development of the
movement itself and not fixed on a predetermined end.
Karl. What you say about aesthetic play intrigues me. It has an attractive combination of
familiarity and strangeness. On the one hand, I like to think that I value both playfulness
and an aesthetic sense in teaching and learning. But I’m not sure I think about those
things the way you do. I’m not sure I play with them the way you do.
There is so much you bring up. I try to grab onto something to play with. I think about
the idea of play itself. To tell you the truth, I’m not sure I see much evidence of a sense
of play in Diane’s, Laurie’s, and Lorraine’s comments, and not just in the sense that they
all appear stressed. For example, why should Diane dislike the moments when her
momentum is interrupted? Can’t she play with those moments? Why does Laurie insist
that there is just one way to “convince students?” Isn’t that an issue to play with? And
Lorraine seems to make people who disagree with her into adversaries. Can’t she just
play? Perhaps the point is that if you want to be serious about play, play isn’t an idea to
play with?
Margaret. On the contrary, play cannot be play in theory alone. It is dependent on the
play. Further, I see Diane, Laurie, and Lorraine totally engaged in play. But, it is play
that is not necessarily harmonious. If play demands being attentive to the emergence and
development of the movement itself, vigilance is required that is evidenced in
uncertainties and tensions. In fact, the movement only exists through these ruptures. The
4
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ruptures expressed by Diane, Laurie, and Lorraine surface the following questions in my
research work throughout the 2-year inquiry:








Given the emphasis in schools on outcomes and results how can teachers be
encouraged to focus on acts of mind instead of end products in their work with
students?
Given the orientations toward technical rationality, to fixed sequence, how do
teachers experience fluid, purposeful learning adventures with students in which
the imagination is given room to play?
Given the tendency to conceive of planning in teaching as the deciding of
everything in advance, how do teachers and students become attuned to making
good judgments derived from within learning experiences?
What can we do to recover the pleasure dwelling within subject matter? How can
teachers and students engage thoughtfully in meaningful learning as opposed to
covering curriculum?

Karl. Those questions are supremely important. I too think it is important to help
teachers break out of the technical mindset that is so prevalent and be able to see other
possibilities. But, as you do, I wonder how to do that. I wonder about just how strong a
presence an undesirable technical rationality has in teachers’ thinking. I think there is
possibility in the play you describe, but I’m not sanguine about its ability to overcome
the dominance of technical rationality.
For instance, Diane, Laurie, and Lorraine appear to have a particular game in mind, one
that, in light of your questions, is concerned for acts of mind as opposed to end products,
fluidity and imagination rather than fixed sequence, judgment within learning
experiences in contrast to deciding everything in advance, and dwelling with subject
matter rather than merely covering subject matter. So, they would seem to have a pretty
good idea of what their game is. How could they experience ruptures, as ruptures unless
they had some expectations of what a smooth process would be?
Don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying teachers shouldn’t have expectations. And I’m all
for this kind of game. But I’m not sure what all this tells us about teachers’ practice,
particularly, how far they have distanced themselves from a narrow technical mindset.
I don’t know if Diane, Laurie, and Lorraine see it this way, but there is the possibility
here that play will be made into a matter for technical rationality of the sort you
question. The unquestioned aim is play, and the only relevant questions concern how to
get there, how to overcome the inconvenient ruptures that might occur, how to ensure
that students “get it.”
There is a more radical form of play that involves playing with the end itself. I’m
thinking of Gadamer’s (1989) conception of phronesis (typically translated as “practical
wisdom”), a form of knowledge different from techne (technical wisdom) and needed
because, “What is right . . . cannot be fully determined independently of the situation
that requires a right action from me” (p. 317). Oftentimes, people confuse what is
5
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practical with what is merely technical. Both are concerned with action in the world, but
while techne is concerned for production of particular ends, phronesis is concerned for
good action (praxis), which includes production but is more encompassing. Practical
wisdom requires reflecting on the good (Irwin, 1997), determining what is right to do in
particular circumstances, and not just determining how to achieve accepted ends.
This is what I had in mind when I asked whether Diane, for example, needed to be more
playful. I wonder if she herself feels that at some level. She says she is “called back to
label the learning.” Yet she also says she dislikes that. Earlier you said that this play is
not fixed on a pre-determined end, which sounds similar to the point I’m trying to make.
Yet are Diane and the others really as engaged in play as you say, or is she actually
more attuned to the technical rationality you criticize?
Margaret. It is not a particular game that Diane, Laurie, and Lorraine have in mind, but
a way to be with others and otherness. Aesthetic play has the character of an event; the
happening of experience. You are stripping play of its historicity and dynamism by
labeling play a set game with imposed rules and specific outcomes. Rather, aesthetic
play assumes an organization and direction for learning emerging in accord with the
movement. Such alertness to perceive relationships amongst parts is akin to the aesthetic
teaching/learning encounters struggled for in these classrooms. The ruptures are
essential and not mere inconveniences. Dewey (1934) notes that sensitivity to the
intimacy of relations that hold parts together is at the heart of the nature of a medium:
“Only when the constituent parts of a whole have the unique end of contributing to the
consummation of a conscious experience, do design and shape lose superimposed
character and become form” (p. 117). It seems aesthetic play manifests itself as a
medium for learning. And, I find it is within the medium, the movement of play, that the
strengths of aesthetic play are revealed in Diane’s, Laurie’s, and Lorraine’s classrooms.
I am aware of recursive patterns that permeate the movement of aesthetic play and
constitute the needed context. It is a context always in the making, like Gadamer’s
(1989) view of play as a pattern or structure continually reconstituted by those who play
along. But, as Dewey (1934) suggests, “I find underlying ‘conditions’ that foster and
sustain aesthetic play such as patterns of attentiveness, personal involvement, emotional
commitment, and room for the creation or invention of meaning.”
These recursive patterns create spaces to play with ideas, search for connections and see
possibilities for students and teachers. Students and teachers become players in such
aesthetic learning encounters with these patterns folding, unfolding, and feeding back
into each other and themselves. Thus, these recursive patterns form philosophical
imperatives asking students and teachers to live in particular ways in classrooms. The
arising pragmatic implications appear to engage participants in ongoing reflection and
deliberation. All grapple with the seductive call of aesthetic play in teaching and
learning . . . sometimes surrendering, sometimes resisting . . . fearful of calcifying the
life, the movement, the beauty from aesthetic play and/or held suspect by emphases on
sequential, hierarchical curriculum implementation and learning outcomes.
The teachers’ thoughts exemplify the active undergoing (open, vulnerable, receptive
6
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attitude) and doing (responding, organizing, discerning) entailed in Dewey’s (1938)
notion of experience as a “moving force” (p. 295). Gadamer (1989) points out that a
fundamental negativity or reversal occurs through this relationship between undergoing
and doing. And, like Gadamer, I see this as being positive and healthy, as a catalyst for
transformation. Its value can be judged only on the grounds of what it moves toward and
into. This is my sense of phronesis, as necessarily intimate to the act of experience itself.
As such, phronesis undermines distinctions between being and knowing, matter and
form, means and ends and lives in-between as a fluid reality. Phronesis’ concern with
particularities demands attunement to process, the act of creating meaning, thus a
movement is generated, always moving towards. I concur with Dewey (1938) that this
movement can be betrayed. Perhaps what you hear in Diane’s voice is fear of betraying
the movement of play as a fluid reality.
Karl. You do a lot to provoke me here (in a good way) so please bear with me as I go on
for a bit.
I don’t think I’m “stripping play of its historicity and dynamism.” I think what I’m
doing is pointing out that play can take some number of forms. You describe a particular
sort of play, which you’re entitled to do, of course, but it is play of a particular sort.
After all, play can take the form of “a set game with imposed rules and specific
outcomes.” People “play” chess, baseball, poker, and all sorts of other games like that.
I’m not saying Diane and the others are doing and thinking the wrong things necessarily.
However, I do think we need to be clear about what they are doing.
You read a lot from the teachers’ comments that I simply do not see. You know much
more than I do about these three people and their teaching, so I’m not saying your
analysis is incorrect. But even if your analysis is correct, I don’t think you have eased
my concerns. You just suggested that what I might be hearing is “fear of betraying play
as a fluid reality.” If that’s right then that would do more to confirm than to relieve my
suspicion that play has become a fixation that might be in conflict with praxis. Insofar as
phronesis is aimed at the good, shouldn’t we be talking about betraying people or the
good or justice or something like that?
Maybe the reply is that people are betrayed if teachers are insensitive to the particulars,
connections, and movements that you associate with play and which I agree are
important elements of a genuine praxis. But here is where I feel the need to make some
discrimination between sorts of play.
I understand that Diane’s “call back to label” may stem from her close attention to the
movement of the inquiry process and other co-temporal processes, but if her focus is on
the good rather than first or solely on the “momentum,” then I’m not sure why she
should dislike these moments. Maybe there’s still a sort of “fluidity” in her thinking, but
then I’m not sure it’s the sort of fluidity we want. This is why the language you use to
describe phronesis, that it lives as a “fluid reality,” strikes me as inadequate. For one
thing, it’s not clear to me Gadamer (1989) says this fluidity “can be judged only on the
grounds of what it moves toward and into.” How about his concern for tradition and
7
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continuity, for example, which suggests obligations not only to what lies ahead but also
to what lies behind, in some sense? But more important, if one really wants to be “fluid”
in the sense of being responsive to the good in particular circumstances, then it seems to
me one would be fully prepared to let go of play if necessary. Maybe one would do that
cautiously or with some regret at the loss of something desirable, but I’m not sure
“dislike” reflects the attitude I’m looking for.
I don’t mean to say Diane and the others shouldn’t be techne-oriented. Surely it is
important at times for teachers to be producers, producers of play, for example. And
techne can involve the sort of play you describe (if I’m understanding it) contrary to the
narrow view that technical rationality is only crude means-ends thinking (see Dunne,
1993). Nonetheless, I believe it’s important to keep the distinction between phronesis
and techne before us, even if they are more closely related than people think sometimes.
Margaret. The distinction between techne and phronesis that I make is that technical
mastery assumes a constant relationship between means and ends assuring a certain
predetermined product. Phronesis assumes no escape from contingency. The object of
phronesis is the movement or play itself. The attention to process shapes the aesthetic
play that I have seen and felt in these classrooms. Such aesthetic play has a structure.
But, I caution that the structure is not a representative fixed form. The conditions or
patterns, talked of previously, create a structure for a living form—allowing for and
supporting play that unfolds. Both Gadamer’s and Dewey’s concern for continuity is
paramount; the past informs the present with implications for the future. Therefore, the
play is always particular to the situation. There are few certainties; the direction is
unpredictable and varied. An ongoing reciprocity between self and other is created and it
is necessarily a fragile relationship. But, it is such fragility that acts as a catalyst for the
fluid movement of play. It is also this fragile, tentative relationship that students and
teachers grapple with. The pull to certainties is evidenced in labeling learning, resisting
or turning away from the movement of play, and grasping for representations. I hear in
the comments of these teachers a catching of selves in this act. Perhaps, this catching of
selves offers a way to look at the notion of play, understood as deliberate action in the
world (Arendt, 1958). The capacity to see what is at stake in a particular situation and
the capacity to make the right decision and act appropriately embraces techne and
phronesis simultaneously; both sharing the central moment of teaching—application.
Karl. I don’t think there is anything in your first points that I’m disagreeing with. For
instance, I agree that there is an appropriate structure in the play you describe but which
cannot be “fixed.” But it still seems to me that there is an important ambiguity in how to
understand that fluidity you talk about. For example, while you say that looking for
labels reflects a pull to certainties and a resistance to play, I would hope that it reflects
just the opposite. Gadamer (1989) writes that “experience is initially always experience
of negation: something is not what it is supposed to be” (p. 317). (Perhaps this was your
earlier point about negativity.) So maybe this is what is happening when the teachers
“catch themselves.” But if one really were open to the experience, then in this case why
would one assume that searching for labels is antithetical to play? To entertain the
perhaps shocking idea that maybe certainties have a place in one’s teaching after all—
8
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that would seem to be the very essence of play.
I agree with you that techne and phronesis come together in application. But, again, we
need to think about how they come together. It still seems to me that the “technical” can
dominate in ways that are undesirable.
Margaret. Carr (2000) also identifies this dilemma. Application taken up in a technicist
manner ignores the particularities of context and follows procedures to a pre-given end.
Thus, technical application avoids questions about the good reducing action to
predefined behavior, substituting finite goals for transformational thinking, and
replacing judgment with predetermined rules and skills. Rather, non-technicist
application considers what is at stake in a situation. This is not a generalizable imposed
wisdom but rather specific to a moment, unanticipated. So, yes, the nature of application
is the direction our conversation has taken. And, I agree that the question of how techne
and phronesis come together is problematic. In fact, the moment I begin to address this I
am lured by what you describe as “technical domination that is undesirable.” I find the
“important ambiguity” you speak of to be concurrently disturbing and beautiful;
disturbing because I inadequately struggle to express the significances for teaching and
learning; beautiful because these significances are striking. Perhaps it is the interplay of
techne and phronesis that warrants consideration. This would displace identification
with each entity and focus attention on the relationship achieved in-between. The inbetween discloses understandings and practical wisdom living within the movement.
Application is where this conjuncture is exemplified. Techne and phronesis cohere into
sensible moments. A unity permeates application that is an embodied lived conjuncture.
Thus, application is an elemental response placing the body at the center of our
conversation. I see a need to develop a place for the body in teaching and learning that
fosters such interplay of techne and phronesis. Catching oneself in the act can be the
inaugural event towards attunement and discernment, for as the application of a moment
lives in sensation its life takes application through understanding. All too often I fear
that teachers succumb to “technical domination that is undesirable” because of demands
to perform, manage, and execute polished, efficient lessons. Taking up the call to play
creates space to live otherwise in classrooms. Taking up the call to play is risky,
continuously questioning what is worthwhile in particular situations. Taking up the call
to play involves pursuing this question as simultaneously open and determinate, finitely
contextualized and infinitely potential. The responsibility entailed is implicit. Play can
reconceptualize the practice of teaching, integrally embracing techne and phronesis. I
also find hope in this embrace towards addressing the questions raised earlier of
emphases in schooling on end products, fixed sequence, and imposed plans.
Karl. There is much more that needs to be said, and we cannot say it all here, but when
you bring application to the forefront I think you set the arena in which any further
conversation has to operate. Application is an important concept for Gadamer (1989), of
course (and a notoriously difficult one). I’m not sure it focuses us on the “in-between”
so much as the “over-and-above,” but if the point is that the locus of concern must be
the particular occasions of teacher judgment and action, I think that is right. There may
be danger in techne dominating phronesis, about which I think we are agreed, but that is
9
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a danger that ultimately can only be faced and overcome in the sort of “movement” you
talk about.
So what are we to say then to teachers like Diane, Laurie, and Lorraine? “Don’t let an
undesirable technical rationality dominate your practice?” That’s great advice, isn’t it?
Maybe what we can and should advise and support is that teachers not be afraid to
“catch” themselves. As you suggest, perhaps catching oneself can be the event that
inaugurates the struggle for wise practice. That’s easy to say. A narrow conception of
technical rationality makes a vice out of disruptions. What emerges is an aesthetic that
contrasts starkly with the aesthetic implied in your conception of play, which I take it,
was your point in the questions you posed earlier.
But we have reason for optimism, don’t we? Your research suggests so, doesn’t it?
Perhaps the desired attunement can be taught. I’m not sure what all you have in mind
when you talk about a place for the body, but in so far as an obstacle to play is teachers’
(mis)understanding of the nature and importance of production, perhaps we can attack
that by teaching the relevance of the body. Again, it seems to me the problem is not
techne per se but rather an impoverished conception of it. Dunne (1993) argues that
“without a sensitivity and responsiveness of the body (through hands, eyes, etc.) the
‘mind’ of the technites cannot comprehend the form” of the object to be produced (p.
353). Perhaps by opening up the possibility of attunement in this way (i.e., physical as
well as intellectual) we can show that it does not work against teachers’ legitimate
concern for production while at the same time setting the stage for further development
of that attunement.
Margaret. Your reference to “over and above” speaks to the transformational
possibilities that arise out of aesthetic play, occurring in-between self and other, arising
out of the purposes and immediacy encountered. I am somewhat cautious about the
words “over and beyond” because they could be interpreted as a higher type of
knowledge. Rather, the transformational knowledge you allude to is intimate to the
action itself. It is this awareness of knowing within experience that phronesis
precipitates. Interwoven into such critical judgments is techne. An impoverished
understanding of technical knowledge confines techne to what is fixed and certain. But,
the realization that all decisions are determined by the possibilities of techne allows me
to see these aspects woven together, derived from within the act or application. It is such
a significance that aesthetic play addresses.
Karl. I acknowledge your point about the danger of my “over and above” language. That
is another issue generated by our conversation. And, I am struck by the generative
character of our conversation. But that fecundity does not happen by itself; play is hard
work. It has been difficult for me to take up this sort of inquiry. I’m not sure how
receptive I have been. Have I become more appreciative of this approach? Have I been
appropriately playful in response to your challenges? I think you have prompted me to
play with different ways of presenting my claims, but it seems to me that I’ve stuck to
my claims pretty consistently. Maybe that is acceptable. Perhaps we still can claim to
have achieved a fusion of horizons such as Gadamer (1989) describes. This fusion does
10
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not require agreement. As Richard Bernstein (1991) states it, “There is a play, a to-andfro movement in dialogical encounters [as opposed to in “adversarial confrontations”], a
seeking for a common ground in which we can understand our differences” (p. 337).
Our conversation confirms for me that we share an interest in these issues as well as a
basic understanding of their nature and significance.
If we respond to the call to play and as a result see the possibility for further play, as I
think we have, that is noteworthy. To discover such possibility is neither inevitable nor
insignificant. I believe that is shown in our conversation as well as in the teachers’
struggles that we have explored. Seemingly, taking up the call to play is not something
one can put down again. Yet, successful play is not assured. You have convinced me
that play can powerfully affect and effect the practice of teaching. Can educators create
conditions where its power will be realized?
Conclusion
Dewey (1934) clarifies our understanding of reaching a conclusion as “no separate and
independent thing; it is the consummation of a movement” (p. 38). Similarly, our
conversational play creates knowledge, but this knowledge is discovered within the play
of appearances. The interplay reveals these appearances to be neither an object or a
concept, but rather, a spirit of inquiry emerging on its own volition. As we succumbed to
this spirit, we gave up individual control, confronted our thinking, and found it altered
by what emerged within the inquiry process. The control became constituted within the
play itself as the call to play gave way to a movement that revised and enlarged
understandings. Similarly, we hope the reader became a player. And, indeed if this is the
case, the evocative, generative character promises to move into many unanticipated
understandings. This is Gadamer’s (1989) thesis in identifying such play as the clue to
ontological experience (pp. 104-110). To learn about other(s) and in turn self, to create
and concomitantly be created, is elemental, ontologically basic to the primacy of being.
Educators must ask themselves if this is not the heart of learning? If so, such play ought
to be accorded central consideration within education. If educators choose to take up the
call to play, the conditions lie within the movement of play. And, its ensuing power is to
be realized, appearing again and again. All taking up the call to play do so forever.
Note
1. The data represented are part of a two-year inquiry conducted at a middle school with
a mandate to infuse arts making processes across the entire curriculum. Twenty-six
students and their parents, 3 teachers and two school administrators participated
throughout the enquiry. Data collection consisted of on-going interviews with all
participants, student work/artifacts, teacher work/artifacts, and classroom observations.
For a more detailed account of the Creative Arts Centre, Milton Williams School,
Calgary Board of Education, Calgary, Alberta, Canada refer to Macintyre Latta (2001)
The Possibilities of Play in the Classroom: On the Power of Aesthetic Experience in
Teaching, Learning, and Researching.
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